COVER-UP AND DENIAL
OF GENOCIDE

Australia, the USA, East Timor,
and the Aborigines

Ben Kiernan

ABSTRACT: Of an estimated population in 1788 of over half a million, fewer than 50,000 Australian Aborigines survived by 1900. Most perished from introduced diseases, but possibly 20,000 Aborigines were killed by British troops, police, and settlers in warfare and massacres accompanying their dispossession. In a neighboring island a century later, Indonesia’s invasion and occupation of East Timor from 1975 to 1999 took more than 120,000 lives, out of a population of 650,000. Australia’s public and press were largely sympathetic to East Timor’s right to self-determination. But a small circle of publicists and commentators, favoring the Suharto regime’s anticommunism, denounced reports of the ongoing Timor tragedy and encouraged Canberra’s diplomatic support for Jakarta. Some of these same Australians also opposed the gathering movement for Aboriginal land rights and reconciliation. Legal victories won by Aborigines in the 1990s, including High Court judgments and a 1997 Human Rights Commission finding that they had been subjected to genocide, exerted pressure on conservative prime minister John Howard, provoking a campaign by his supporters to deny that genocide had occurred. A common feature of these two cases of Australian genocide denial was “right-wing” refusal to concede legitimacy to causes enlisting “left-wing” support.

As the crowd were walking up the hill, we could hear a car speeding towards us. EVERYBODY DOWN, Denis yelled, and we all dropped to the ground, hidden by the tall spear grass….Except Topsy Secretary, an Aboriginal elder of the Larrakia people who along with Fred Fogarty had come along in support. Without hesitation Denis applied a classic flying tackle and brought her to the ground. The driver would have been watching the road and wouldn’t have gazed up to his left on the sweeping curve.1
This late 1970s Australian outback scene, sketched by Darwin trade unionist Brian Manning, was one incident in a five-year campaign to maintain radio contact with the beleaguered people of East Timor. After invading the territory in 1975, killing six Australian journalists there and imposing a news blackout, Indonesian forces were closing in on the Timorese resistance. Almost the only news of the resistance in East Timor was broadcast from a radio mounted on the back of a donkey in the rugged highlands of the former Portuguese colony. The weak signal barely crossed the Arafura Sea to the Top End of the Northern Territory. There the Australian government, in appeasement of Jakarta, attempted to block the transmissions and prevent their contents being passed on to the outside world. It was fear of official surveillance that brought Topsy Secretary to the ground in the outback that day.

In 1974, Denis Freney of the Communist Party of Australia (CPA) had come through Darwin en route to Timor, before returning to Sydney to establish the Campaign for an Independent East Timor (CIET). In Darwin Freney met Brian Manning, who was also a CPA member, and found him “able to see the importance of the independence struggle in Timor more than anyone else I had met.” Manning and Lai Con Liong, a Timorese-born Darwin wharf laborer, traveled to East Timor for a week in May 1975, and leaders of the Fretilin resistance would stay in Manning’s caravan whenever they pased through Darwin. CIET shipped six radio transceivers to Fretilin in Dili a few weeks before the December 1975 invasion. Manning kept a seventh transceiver in Darwin and was able to receive details of the first killings after the Indonesian landing. But the next month, the Australian Security Intelligence Organization seized the transceiver operated by a Timorese in Darwin.

Manning moved his radio operation into the outback. It was another three years before Indonesian forces tracked down and killed the Timorese resistance leader Nicolau Lobato and finally silenced the radio broadcasts. During that time, with the help of other wharf laborers, CPA activists, local Timorese Toni Belo and Estansilau da Silva, and Queensland-born Aborigine Fred Fogarty, Manning kept open the radio link to the closed territory. Australian federal police, in years of wild emu chases through the outback, pursued this unique team who were playing an undiplomatic role — informing the world of an unfolding tragedy. More than 120,000 of East Timor’s 650,000 people perished in crimes against humanity that meet most definitions of genocide and, arguably, the United Nations legal definition of genocide of a “national group.”

Two decades later, in the run-up to the 2000 Olympic Games in Sydney, the international spotlight focused on Australia’s Aborigines. Prime Minister John Howard, who had served as treasurer in the 1975-83 government that enforced the crackdown on radio contact with East Timor, now refused to make an official apology to the Aboriginal people for the dispossession and genocide that Australia’s High Court and Human Rights Commission ruled they had suffered under previous governments. Howard offered a personal expression of regret, but public pressure mounted for an official apology. At this time, the U.S. Bureau

---

* See resource listings on p. 166 below.

In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial, or religious group, as such:

- Killing members of the group;
- Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
- Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
- Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
- Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

of Indian Affairs accepted “moral responsibility” for the “sorrowful truths” that “the United States enforced its ambition against the Indian nations,” waged “war on Indian people” by “threat, deceit and force,” and committed “acts so terrible that they infect, diminish and destroy the lives of Indian people decades later, generations later.” Now, a U.S. official said, “the legacy of these misdeeds haunts us….These wrongs must be acknowledged.” But Australian domestic defenses withstood this foreign example. As the Olympics opened, Howard made no apology to Aborigines. Instead, conservative Australian columnists and publishers backing his refusal launched a media campaign to deny that Aborigines had suffered genocide.

Australian attempts to cover up mass murder in East Timor and deny the Aboriginal genocide both involved groups associated with the conservative journals News Weekly and Quadrant — though neither exclusively nor unanimously. Domestic politics and foreign diplomacy often intersect. A view current in official circles was, “If we criticize Indonesia for its takeover of East Timor, they could have a lot to say about our treatment of the Aborigines.” One result was, in Beverley Smith’s words, “a conspiracy of silence between two established orders.”

Denying or downplaying genocide is the exclusive province of neither the right nor the left. Communists had denied the evidence of Stalin’s mass murders in the USSR. In the case of Cambodia, leftists welcomed the 1975 Khmer Rouge victory and rightists resisted their 1979 defeat. In Australia, international anticomununism fostered denial of two genocides committed by non-communists close to home. Yet critics of these genocides included other members of the Australian right, as well as independents and leftists. Support for the Timorese and the Aborigines, as for the victims of Stalin and Pol Pot, came from many viewpoints, including religious groups.

As a small but diverse team kept open the radio link to Timor, influential Australian anticomununists helped cover up or deny the mass murder there for a quarter century. Why? The Timor tragedy ended only in 1999 when Howard,
Resources: East Timor


Resources: Australian Aborigines

- Ian Clark, *Scars in the Landscape: A Register of Massacre Sites in Western Victoria, 1803-1859* (Canberra: AIATSIS, 1995).
bowing at last to public opinion, sent troops to Timor’s rescue. What were the
motives of his influential backers who meanwhile denied the genocide of the
Aborigines? How were the two causes linked?

The Timor Tragedy

The weak radio signal between East Timor and northern Australia was not the
first connection between the two countries. Australians had fought in Timor
during World War II, when possibly 50,000 East Timorese had perished under
Japanese occupation. The victims comprised 10 percent of the population of
the small Portuguese colony. Australia’s consul in the territory in 1962-64,
James Dunn, called this “one of the great catastrophes of World War II in terms
of relative loss of life.” 12 Australian troops who battled Japanese forces there in
1942-43 have always been grateful to the Timorese who supported them, espe-
cially in light of the deadly Japanese retribution against Timorese after the Aus-
tralian withdrawal. 13 “In areas where the Australians had been active, villages
were razed to the ground and whole families wiped out,” Dunn wrote.

Years later, the commander of the 2/2nd Independent Company, Colonel
Bernard Callinan, still remembered the debt his men owed the Timorese. He
named his Australian home “Belulic” after his former headquarters in Timor. 14
And after the 1974 coup in Portugal raised hopes of Timorese independence,
Callinan wrote that Australian veterans “would feel betrayed by an Australian
government that made a facile decision on the future of these friendly, loyal and
courageous people.” He urged, “Our Government should ensure that at least
ample time and facilities are given them in their time of uncertainty to deter-
mine and express freely their desires for the future.” 15

Sadly, self-determination for East Timor was a quarter century away. In
mid-1975 the leftist independence movement, Fretlin, won 55 percent of the
vote in village-level elections. 16 But successive Australian governments
supported Indonesia’s brutal invasion of December 1975, which caused the
deaths of 120,000 Timorese by 1979. As in World War II, the Timorese had to fight on alone.

And unfortunately for them, Colonel Callinan had also changed his mind about their right to self-determination. In April 1975, along with Australia’s Joint Intelligence Organisation, Callinan is said to have advised Fretlin’s then coalition partner, the UDT Party, to quit the coalition for an “anticommunist” alliance with a tiny pro-Indonesian grouping, Apodeti. In a reversal of his initial call for self-determination, Callinan wrote in 1977: “Having lived with, and closely with, these people, I am convinced that East Timor is not a viable independent nation. To talk of these people exercising a ‘free choice’ is to be quite unrealistic.” By 1981, according to human rights activist Patrick Walsh, Callinan was “the only ex-commando who was in Timor in World War II to publicly support East Timor’s integration into Indonesia.” Why did he abandon the people he once saw as friends? The answer lies not in East Timor, but in Australian anticommmunism, including its specific domestic features, coupled with U.S. policy toward Indonesia.

Australian Anticommmunism and Asia

Colonel Callinan was an important figure in the secretive, right-wing National Civic Council (NCC). Unlike Callinan, the Council’s president, B. A. (Bob) Santamaria (1915-1998), had been exempted from military service in World War II, at the instigation of the Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne. During the 1930s, he had been a vocal supporter of Fascism, with what has been called an “even-handed” and a “generous view of the rise of Nazism.” He opposed Hitler’s repression of Catholics, but on 28 May 1939 he denied Germany was “sufficiently criminal in its mentality to desire war,” and he opposed aerial bombardment. Following Hitler’s invasion of Poland, Santamaria spent the war years quietly organizing Australian Catholic anticommmunist groups, including the Movement, forerunner of the NCC. He “made no public contribution to debate on the issues involved” in World War II. After 1945, no longer opposed to aerial bombing, Santamaria made vociferous public statements favoring all of Australia’s other wars during his lifetime.

Working mostly behind the scenes, Santamaria was an enduring and influential public figure. The Movement, which he led in the 1940s and 1950s, fought communist-led trade unions and sought control of the Australian Labor Party (ALP). Like the Communist Party, the Movement used scare-mongering, ballot-rigging, hounding of dissidents, and ad hominem attacks on public opponents. The ALP split in 1955. Santamaria sponsored the minority Democratic Labor Party (DLP), which controlled the balance of power in Australian parliaments for two decades. Santamaria’s NCC and the DLP both supported the conservative government headed by the Liberal Party and successfully kept the ALP out of office until the election of the Whitlam Labor government in 1972.

———

* Bruce Duncan, Crusade or Conspiracy?, quotes a Movement resolution “to secure the control of the [ALP] Federal Executive and Conference...by July 1952 at the latest” (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2001), 177.
Santamaria and the NCC advanced a mix of principles and policies to lead a mostly working-class Irish Catholic minority away from its traditional Labor allegiance and toward conservative anticommunism. Along with the left, Santamaria opposed the discriminatory “White Australia” immigration policy, but by contrast he also opposed Indonesian independence from Dutch colonial rule in 1949.29 He hoped Australia “could be a major force in the conversion of Asia to Christianity,” making “the great sacrifice which will be needed to preserve Australia as a nation of primarily European texture.”30 Santamaria warned that “Australia will be destroyed as a nation” by communism, Islam, Hinduism or a pagan occupying power, and in 1951 he predicted war “against the Asiatic countries within ten years.”31 Citing the conflict in Korea, the magazine News Weekly, which he edited, warned that 1952 “might well be one of the last years in the history of the Australian nation as we know it.”32

As fighting escalated in Vietnam, Colonel Callinan became an advisor to the Catholic-led Diem regime in Saigon, and Santamaria became an early and prominent advocate of U.S. and Australian intervention. They worked hard to contest the critique mounted by a growing domestic antiwar movement. News Weekly ran editorials stating that there were “no children burned by napalm” in Vietnam (April 1967), with titles like “Napalm? No, Stolen Petrol” (20 September 1967) and “The Great Napalm Lie Exposed” (27 March 1968). Santamaria argued that “the number of victims is minimal, because the Americans have undertaken extraordinary precautions.” His preferred explanation for injuries caused by napalm bombing was: “Many children were burned by overturned oil lamps or by the explosion of kerosene lamps into which their parents had poured high-octane petrol taken from fuel dumps.”33 In 1969, Santamaria called the slaughter of civilians at My Lai a “battle.” The hundreds of women and children killed were falsely termed surrendered combatants.34 Santamaria regarded Nixon’s 1970 invasion of Cambodia as “long overdue” and urged its expansion.35 He dismissed the publication of the Pentagon Papers the next year, denouncing “North Vietnamese wolves in New York Times clothing.”36

Santamaria appeared regularly in the mainstream media and was also active in right-wing intellectual circles.37 In 1956 he had successfully recommended a Catholic convert and Movement official, the anti-modernist poet Prof. James McAuley, as editor of the new conservative magazine Quadrant, launched with CIA funding by the Australian Committee for Cultural Freedom.38 McAuley, an expert on the Australian colony of New Guinea, urged officials to “Christianise not Westernise,” warned that an independent New Guinea would be “a coconut republic which could do little good for itself,” and advocated the territory’s incorporation with full citizenship rights in a “perpetual union” with Australia.39 Under his editorship, Quadrant’s literary content and aggressive anticommunism expanded its intellectual influence, government patronage, and political discretion. McAuley visited Jakarta several months after Suharto’s takeover of Indonesia, at the height of the 1965-66 massacre of an estimated 800,000 suspected communists, which the CIA privately described as “one of the worst mass murders of the twentieth century.”40 In Quadrant, McAuley wrote just this: “The coup and its bloody aftermath had resulted in a strange stalemate at the
time of my visit. From such a fluid and ambiguous situation anything can arise, and I shall not speculate upon possibilities....”\(^{31}\) Its CIA sponsor had already found *Quadrant* “too right wing,” and “wanted to distance the magazine from its regular contributors,” including Santamaria. *Quadrant* ignored the advice.\(^{32}\)

In 1968 Professor Heinz Arndt, a former refugee from Hitler now at the Australian National University and later to become co-editor of *Quadrant*, wrote:

There is still much exercise of arbitrary power by civil and military officials, especially outside Djakarta, acts of oppression, even persecution of actual or suspected enemies of the new regime. But most of this reflects, not the will of the Suharto Government, but its inability or reluctance to assert its will....The Suharto Government is genuinely and desperately anxious not to be thought undemocratic, militaristic, dictatorial. It wants to educate and persuade, not to ride roughshod over anyone....Indonesia now has a very much more moderate, more rational, more pragmatic leadership than for many years....\(^{33}\)

Kissinger and Timor

As in Vietnam, Australian anticommunists looked to the United States for foreign policy leadership. Washington supported Suharto’s destruction of Indonesia’s communists, which *Time* hailed as “the West’s best news for years in Asia.”\(^{34}\) A decade later, the United States was more discreet in backing Jakarta’s invasion of East Timor. President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger paid a visit to Suharto on 6 December 1975, and, as evidence shows, approved the Indonesian invasion he launched the next day.\(^{44}\) Suharto told them: “We want your understanding if we deem it necessary to take rapid or drastic action.” Ford replied: “We will understand and will not press you on the issue.” Kissinger then added: “You appreciate that the use of U.S.-made arms could create problems....It depends on how we construe it; whether it is in self-defense or is a foreign operation. It is important that whatever you do succeeds quickly. We would be able to influence the reaction in America if whatever happens happens after we return. This way there would be less chance of people talking in an unauthorized way....We understand your problem and the need to move quickly....Whatever you do, however, we will try to handle in the best way possible....If you have made plans, we will do our best to keep everyone quiet until the President returns home.”\(^{35}\)

---


But back in Washington on 18 December 1975, Kissinger saw a State Department cable describing Indonesia’s use of U.S. arms in East Timor as violating the terms of their supply, requiring an end to deliveries. He scolded his aides: “I thought we had a disciplined group; now we’ve gone to pieces completely. Take this cable on East Timor….I would not have approved it. The only consequence is to put yourself on record.” He feared the cable might leak. “I had told you to stop it quietly.” There was no need to record a token order. “I said do it for a few weeks and then open up again.” Assistant Secretary of State Philip Habib was more confident: “The cable will not leak.” Kissinger retorted: “Yes it will and it will go to Congress too and then we will have hearings on it.” Habib replied: “I was away. I was told by cable that it had come up.” This dismayed Kissinger: “That means there are two cables. And that means twenty guys have seen it.” He warned: “It will have a devastating impact on Indonesia. There’s this masochism in the extreme here. No one has complained that it was aggression….And we can’t construe a Communist government in the middle of Indonesia as self-defense?” When his legal advisor asked: “What do we say to Congress if we’re asked?” Kissinger replied: “We cut it off while we are studying it. We intend to start again in January.” There was thus no effective interruption of U.S. arms supplies to Indonesia.

**Cover-up Down Under**

Australian diplomats in Indonesia admired Kissinger’s approach. A few weeks later, on 5 January 1976, Canberra’s ambassador to Jakarta, Richard Woolcott, cabled home recommending “Kissingerian realism.” Like Woolcott and former prime minister Gough Whitlam, Bernard Callinan and Bob Santamaria now became spokespersons for Indonesia’s incorporation of East Timor. Callinan gave priority to regional political interests. He said that “to talk of Indonesia withdrawing is not only unreal, it can also only cause unnecessary friction between Australia and its nearest neighbour.”

Santamaria, according to Patrick Walsh, “actively and continually maintained a public defence of Jakarta over its East Timor actions.” News Weekly and Quadrant took similar stances. Rather than criticize Indonesia, News Weekly assailed its opponents. The Fretelin resistance, the magazine stated, was guilty of “mass executions,” including “horrors like the beheading of babies and small children.” Santamaria and News Weekly falsely alleged that James Dunn, former Australian consul in East Timor, was “a committed supporter of Fretelin,” leading a “Campaign against Indonesia,” and that Australian Jesuit Fr. Mark

---

*Kissinger feared that the cable “will leak in three months and it will come out that Kissinger overruled his pristine bureaucrats and violated the law….You have a responsibility to recognize that we are living in a revolutionary situation. Everything on paper will be used against me….To put it into a cable 30 hours before I return, knowing how cables are handled in this building, guarantees that it will be a national disaster.” Kissinger asked: “Am I wrong in assuming that the Indonesians will go up in smoke if they hear about this?….I know what the law is but how can it be in the US national interest for us to….kick the Indonesians in the teeth.” Memorandum of Conversation, 18 December 1975, Washington, D.C., “Subject: Departmental Policy.”*
Raper belonged to “the vanguard of Marxism.” Walsh described Santamaria’s approach:

A report from Indonesian Church sources compiled in late 1976 painted a black picture of 60,000 to 100,000 deaths [in East Timor], widespread opposition to Indonesia and widespread support of Fretelin. Clearly there was a need to keep the source of the document confidential — such information from Church sources in Jakarta was in direct contradiction to everything Jakarta was saying about Timor. Mr. Santamaria’s “Point of View” article (9.2.77) claimed that the source of the report “has never been identified” (true) but then falsely claims, “nobody knows who produced” the reports (false). The reason the source had to remain confidential was obvious — but Santamaria used this to discredit the information. Two months later, Indonesian foreign minister Adam Malik conceded that “50,000 people or perhaps 80,000 might have been killed during the war in Timor, but we saved 600,000 of them.”

Australians followed three imperatives in covering up genocide in East Timor. The first was anticommunism. As he had during World War II, Santamaria devoted his energies to opposing communism. He warned that “a government dominated by the Fretelin would extend the tentacles of Communist subversion to Australia’s doorstep.” An independent East Timor would be “open to Red Chinese or Russian influence, [and] could easily become a base of subversion.” It would sooner or later be “influencing all these repressed and discontented elements” in other parts of Suharto’s Indonesia. As in Vietnam, the potential for communist subversion, rather than outright invasion, was the real threat. In this worldview, a critic commented, “even the Catholics of East Timor had to lose their rights,” and Indonesian Church sources had to be ignored.

The Indonesian voice Santamaria heeded belonged to what he called “the most influential foreign policy-making body associated with the Indonesian Government”: the Centre for Strategic and International Studies headed by Harry Tjan Silalahi and Jusuf Wanandi, who had helped plan the first Indonesian operations against Timor from 1974.

For slightly different reasons than those propounded by successive prime ministers Gough Whitlam, Malcolm Fraser, Bob Hawke, and Paul Keating, Santamaria effectively supported the official view that close relations with anticomunist Indonesia were crucial to Australia’s security — the second imperative. Canberra would not risk antagonizing a populous, militarized neighbor, even if its regime was committing mass murder. Whitlam and Australian officials and diplomats rejected the argument that Australia should not support violations of international law like the invasion of East Timor. If Whitlam was moved by realpolitik, for Santamaria the key was anticommunism. The combination was persuasive in upholding the policy, but the realpolitik proved illusory: like Indonesian control, Australian policy eventually proved ineffective, and both collapsed in 1999.

A third factor was the view of Santamaria and others that Australia’s domestic “left” could not be allowed to go unchallenged, whatever the truth of its case for East Timor. Credible policy criticisms were the most dangerous: silence or
acknowledgement of the truth would yield domestic political ground to the left. Given such priorities, the very indefensibility of a policy ensured that it would be defended. Like many international ideologues, Santamaria’s priority was not to address problems facing East Timor, but to combat “communist” influence at home. One commentator remarked that conservative motivations in defending Indonesia “are generally more connected with ideological struggles that are going on in Australia, and within particular Australian institutions.”

For these purposes, then, the genocide had to be hidden from view, a tactic the United States pursued and one that Canberra aimed to follow. As Kissinger left office, other U.S. politicians stepped forward to cover up what was happening in East Timor. Australian conservative attacks on former consul James Dunn were echoed in the U.S. Congress in 1977. Republican Congressman Herbert Burke lambasted Dunn and asserted that “it is in all our interests to bury the Timor issue quickly and completely.” The State Department’s 1977 Human Rights Report did not mention East Timor, and that year the New York Times gave zero coverage to events there, while tens of thousands perished.

In Australia, it was far more difficult to hide events so close at hand. There, by contrast, press coverage was extensive. Domestic public outrage made Timor policy an embarrassment to the government. Anticommunists struck back with excess, ranging from denunciation to denial. In Quadrant in May 1976, Heinz Arndt blamed “the left” as “part of the explanation” for the press and public turning against Indonesia. He wrote: At no stage has there been any assertion by Indonesia of irredentist claims on East Timor,” adding that “President Suharto’s deference to foreign (and not least Australian Government) pressure to abstain from the use of force may have been a mistake.” Arndt joined Quadrant’s editorial board in 1978. The next year, at the height of the tragedy, he published another article, “Timor: Vendetta against Indonesia.” Decrying the “unrestrained abuse and wild charges” made against Jakarta, Arndt denounced its critics as “radical ideologues, aggrieved journalists, emotional priests and Wilsonian idealists.” But events in Timor had already vindicated such diverse critics, especially James Dunn, whom Arndt considered “motivated and grossly inaccurate.” Just the previous month, Indonesia’s new foreign minister Mochtar Kusumaatmadja had estimated that 120,000 Timorese had died since 1975. The admission did not threaten Canberra’s support for Jakarta, but Quadrant, like News Weekly, facilitated the government’s defense of its policy against strong public protest.

Still Suharto’s forces could not destroy Fretilin, which they termed “gangs of security disruptors” (GPK). Indonesian commanders in Dili acknowledged confidentially in 1982 that “despite the heavy pressure and the disadvantageous conditions under which they operate, the GPK has nevertheless been able to

---

hold out in the bush,” and can still deploy “a very sizeable concentration of forces in one place.” After seven years of occupation, Fretilin “support networks” still existed “in all settlements, the villages as well as the towns.” These “underground networks are closely related to customs and to the family system.” Indonesian commanders aimed “to obliterate the classic GPK areas” and “crush the GPK remnants to their roots.”

News of the continuing death toll in East Timor grew, along with Australian public concern. Anticommunist denial became more strident, and the domestic left were still blamed for publicizing the story. But it was also more difficult to hold this line, and in 1983-84 a voice of dissent was heard. Quadrant’s new foreign policy columnist, former Labor senator John Wheeldon, called Jakarta’s takeover of East Timor “an act of patently unjustified aggression” without “anything resembling a bona fide act of self-determination.” He was responding to a Quadrant cover story that had questioned the charge of Indonesian “aggression” and asserted that “there is now no hope that East Timor will become an independent sovereign state.” The article’s authors called for a negotiated peace, an end to Fretilin resistance, and admission of more refugees into Australia. These authors also chastised critics of Jakarta for “virulence” and “intemperate denunciation,” adding: “Those who maintain the pretence that independence for East Timor is still a possibility have in the result hampered efforts to assist the East Timorese.”

When Wheeldon responded, Heinz Arndt asserted: “Evidence of breaches of human rights by the Indonesians in East Timor is confined to highly suspect reports.” Quadrant’s media columnist, Anthony McAdam, praising Singapore and Malaysia as “genuine democracies,” lauded Suharto’s Indonesia as “relatively pluralistic.”

Quadrant’s continuing support for Jakarta reinforced official policy. John Howard, who became leader of the conservative Opposition in Canberra in 1985, complained that “the preoccupation of the left of Australian politics with East Timor has needlessly soured our relations with Indonesia.” Arndt asserted that Indonesia’s claim to East Timor was “exactly on a par” with China’s claim to Hong Kong, yet Jakarta was receiving a “flood of abuse” motivated by “Left-wing hostility” and “racist arrogance.” A Quadrant editorial compared leftist critics of Arndt and fellow members of the “Indonesia Lobby” to “fanatical anti-semites.” In 1995, the magazine’s columnist Peter Ryan rejoined the attack on “these left-wing lunatics”: “The Timor claque increasingly resemble the English prigs of the left in the 1930s….Timor is unfortunate, and when President Suharto shuts down a newspaper it does not make me happy. But it probably makes the ordinary people of Indonesia very happy indeed that he is steadily improving their living standards.”

Arndt again excoriated “the fanatical East Timor lobby” for “its perennial campaign of propaganda and disinformation against Indonesia.” He asked why

---

have “sections of the Australian Press and public objected so violently to the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia?” Arndt had posed this same question in 1976, finding leftist influence to be “part of the explanation.” By 1995, it had become “the chief explanation.” The right-wing response was defensive. A Quadrant contributor who, like Santamaria, had defended the repressive Diem regime in South Vietnam, went so far as to assert that “even in human rights there is a case for Suharto,” who was merely “a monster of the Left’s imagination.” After Howard was elected prime minister in 1996, his Deputy PM, Tim Fischer, eulogized Suharto as “the man of the second half of the century.”

As late as 1995 Arndt claimed that “there is little evidence that the majority of East Timorese want independence….The majority who have benefited greatly from very large Indonesian expenditure on roads and other infrastructure and on health and education, so long neglected by the Portuguese, are by all disinterested accounts not dissatisfied.” Just four years later, however, 79 percent of the Timorese would vote for independence in the August 1999 UN-organized referendum.

As the referendum approached, Indonesian officers and Timorese militia commanders met on 16 February 1999. Indonesian lieutenant-colonel Yahya Sudrajad called for the killing of pro-independence movement leaders, their children, and even their grandchildren. “Not a single member of their families was to be left alive, the colonel told the meeting,” after receiving orders from senior Indonesian military commanders. Militia killings commenced the next day. Survivors sought refuge in churches and priests’ homes. On 26 March, the Indonesian-appointed governor of East Timor, Abilio Soares, gave orders “that the priests and nuns should be killed.” In Australia, Heinz Arndt again denounced charges of genocide as anti-Indonesian “propaganda.” In Dili, Indonesia’s military commander Tono Suratman warned that “if the pro-independents do win…all will be destroyed. It will be worse than twenty-three years ago.” In May 1999, an Indonesian army document ordered that “massacres should be carried out from village to village after the announcement of the ballot if the pro-independence supporters win.” The East Timorese independence movement “should be eliminated from its leadership down to its roots.”

The forced deportation of hundreds of thousands was also planned. The deportation was implemented after the vote when Indonesian-sponsored militias went on a rampage, killing possibly a thousand people and destroying up to 80 percent of the territory’s houses. Australian public opinion, which had long favored

---

independence for East Timor, even “if a left-wing group gains control there,” finally forced the abandonment of Canberra’s policy.  

Western appeasement of Indonesia since 1975, including over $1 billion in military supplies from the United States, Britain, and Australia, had enabled the initial Timor tragedy to be repeated. Even now Douglas Paal, president of the U.S. Asia Pacific Policy Center, told the Washington Post that “Timor is a speed bump on the road to dealing with Jakarta, and we’ve got to get over it safely.” It was not this view, however, that Heinz Arndt decried in criticizing “the one-sidedness of Western opinion, which focused on the hostilities but overlooked the major effort which the Indonesian government was devoting to improving the economic and social infrastructure of the territory.” In 2001, the UN organized the territory’s first free election. Fretilin won 57 percent of the vote, close to the 55 percent it had received in village-level elections before the invasion. In the interim, 100,000-200,000 Timorese had died.

The Australian Aborigines

The Australian cover-up of the mass murder in East Timor in the service of anticommunism and misguided realpolitik echoes in the ongoing denial of the genocide of Australian Aborigines. While the latter springs in part from conflict over material resources on Aboriginal land, it shares the common feature of demonization of the domestic “left.”

Australian politicians of the two-party conservative coalition were not unanimous in support of Jakarta. Liberal parliamentarians Alan Missen and Michael Hodgman criticized Indonesia’s invasion, as did Australia’s first Aboriginal senator, Neville Bonner, also a Liberal, who had visited East Timor. But support for
both East Timor and Aboriginal rights was more widespread among independent religious organizations, the ALP, and the unions, especially on the left.

The Aboriginal rights issue emerged slowly against a backdrop of genocide. The Aboriginal population of Australia at the time of British settlement in 1788 is estimated to have been roughly 750,000. It fell to only 31,000 by 1911, with up to 600,000 deaths following the initial British arrival, mostly from new diseases like smallpox. Historian Henry Reynolds plausibly estimates that approximately 20,000 more blacks were killed resisting the white occupation of Australia between 1788 and 1901. Then, in the twentieth century, Australian governments took thousands of “half-caste” children from their mothers, to “breed out the colour.” From 1910 to 1970, 10 percent of Aboriginal children were separated from their families. Queensland’s Chief Protector of Native Affairs from 1913 to 1942 aimed to “preserve the purity of the white race from the grave social dangers that always threaten where there is a degraded race living in loose condition at its back door.” The Northern Territory’s Chief Protector from 1927 to 1939 advocated eugenics, arguing that by the sixth generation, “all native characteristics of the Australian Aborigines are eradicated. The problem of our half-castes will quickly be eliminated by the complete disappearance of the black race.” At a 1937 Canberra conference of Australian officials responsible for Aboriginal affairs, Western Australia’s Chief Protector, A. O. Neville, explained his view to a reporter, who wrote “that within one hundred years the pure black will be extinct. But the half caste problem was increasing…Therefore their idea was to keep the pure blacks segregated and absorb the half-castes into the white population….The pure black was not a quick breeder. On the other hand the half-caste was….In order to secure the complete segregation of the children…[at age two] they were taken from their mothers and reared in accordance with white ideas.” Neville asked the conference: “Are we going to have a population of one million blacks…or are we going to merge them into our white community and eventually forget that there were any Aborigines in Australia?”

As with East Timor, the Aboriginal rights cause attracted early support from the left, and some from the right. From 1931 the Communist Party of Australia denounced the “mass physical extermination” to which Aborigines had been subjected, and called for “absolute prohibition of the kidnapping of Aboriginal children.” Leftists supported the Aboriginal Day of Mourning and Protest in 1938, the Catholic Worker took up Aboriginal causes in 1942, and a human rights movement emerged in 1946. The next year Santamaria’s News Weekly decried the mistreatment of Aborigines and suggested they be taught agriculture. Removals of Aboriginal children continued. Aborigines gained the right to vote in Australian federal elections only in 1965.

Santamaria and other conservatives, initially not hostile to Aborigines, hardened their stance after the issue became one of restitution rather than citizenship. Many outback Aborigines began to fight for land rights to gain economic autonomy and compensation for their dispossession. The cause slowly gathered support. Santamaria began to oppose Aboriginal land rights activists, whether radicals or religious conservatives. As substantial uranium deposits
were discovered on Aboriginal lands, pastoral and mining company lobbyists opposed land rights, and *Quadrant* authors joined the fray. While many of the Aboriginal movement’s leading figures were politically independent, anticommunists often neglected and increasingly opposed Aboriginal causes, while communists, leftists, and many liberals were supportive.

**The Land Rights Movement**

In 1961, Brian Manning, two Aboriginal brothers, Dexter and David Daniels, and twenty-two other Aborigines founded the Northern Territory Council for Aboriginal Rights. They aimed to prod trade union organizations to improve Aboriginal wages.\(^{104}\) In 1963, thirteen tribes sent the Australian Parliament a bark petition protesting the “secret” excision from their reserve, for the Nabalco bauxite mining company, of 140 square miles of “hunting and food gathering land for the Yirrkala tribes from time immemorial; we were all born here.” They feared “the fate which has overtaken the Larrakeah [Larrakia] tribe.”\(^{105}\)

At Daguragu (Wattie Creek), also in the Northern Territory, Aboriginal stockmen received a weekly wage of only A$6.32. In mid-1966 a hundred Gurindji stockmen demanded wage parity and went on strike against the world’s largest cattle station, the Wave Hill Pastoral Company, owned by Lord Vestey.\(^{106}\) With Dexter Daniels, by then Aboriginal organizer for the North Australian Workers Union, Manning drove the first truckload of stores to Wattie Creek to support the Gurindji strikers’ camp. His 1.5 ton truck, “loaded to the gunnels” with flour, sugar, tea, baking powder, rice and tobacco, “shook to pieces over the rough roads.”\(^{107}\) The Gurindji re-occupied and claimed their traditional tribal lands. In 1970 the Waterside Workers’ Federation imposed a $1 levy on all members, producing a $17,000 donation to enable the Gurindji to fence their land.\(^{108}\) In 1972, Lord Vestey handed over ninety square kilometers and soon sold another 3,250 to the government to be given to the Gurindji.\(^{109}\) When he joined the Campaign for an Independent East Timor in 1974, Manning was working with the Larrakia people and their traditional elder, Bobby Secretary, who were claiming tribal land in Darwin.\(^{110}\) His actions made connections between domestic and foreign concerns that others worked hard to obscure.\(^{111}\)

Bob Santamaria and his anticomunist allies, by contrast, believed that Timorese independence, acknowledgment of Jakarta’s crimes against humanity, recognition of the genocide of the Aborigines, or redress for their dispossession by granting land rights, would be the first steps down a slippery slope of communist appeasement. Just as he denounced leftist and Jesuit supporters of the Timorese, Santamaria now campaigned against the Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace (CCJP), which took up the land rights cause. Among his targets was the Aboriginal priest Pat Dodson, who in 1980-81 headed a joint task force of the CCJP and the Australian Council of Churches on Aboriginal land rights education. Dodson left the priesthood in 1981 and later chaired the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation.

Like its left-liberal counterpart *Meanjin*,\(^{112}\) during its first decades *Quadrant* had run some thoughtful pieces on Aboriginal themes, including a critique of “the inability of Australians to come to terms with their genocidal past” in which
“settlers systematically destroyed the blacks.”

But now the rise of the land rights movement met conservative opposition. Western Mining Company executive director Hugh Morgan campaigned against Aboriginal causes, especially after he became president of the Australian Mining Industry Council in 1981.

An anonymous Quadrant article accused “sections of the affluent middle class” of “a guilt complex about the Aborigines which at times assumes grotesque proportions.” The author compared the Aboriginal tragedy “to that of unemployed youth, drug addicts, deserted wives and other groups of victims.” Criticizing advocates of “cultural convergence,” the author asked: “How does a platypus converge with a sheep dog?” As for land rights, “History, to have been there first, is a weak ethical basis for claims to possession…Australia is today…what the descendants of white settlers have made it. It is they, not the Aborigines, who have established the more substantial claim to possession.” Aborigines merely needed help to “rise from their present state of backwardness and misery.” When Bob Hawke’s Labor government came to office in 1983 proposing uniform federal land rights legislation, Quadrant proclaimed Aboriginal lands “better suited than almost any others in the world for disposal of the nuclear waste materials which the world’s ever growing nuclear power industry will generate.”

Quadrant contributor Elizabeth Durack (1915-2000) wrote:

Sad as it was for both mother and child, most, if not all Aboriginal women, were resigned to the idea of their half-caste children being taken from them….Many came forward with them as babies or youngsters and tearfully presented them to the Mission or to the recruiting parties that went through the stations and out-back towns collecting pale-skinned infants and placing them either with white foster-parents or in Church orphanages. Aboriginal women were well aware of all this. That was why they bad half-caste children. That was what they used, as opportunity arose, their bodies for.

On the next page began Roger Scruton’s argument against land rights. He described “the Untergang of the savage” as the “inevitable” result of “a weak culture confronted with a strong one,” adding, “we shouldn’t even contemplate undoing the supposedly illegitimate settlement.” It “would have happened anywhere” — “when finite, mortal beings, imperfect beings given to evil, settle anywhere — they destroy as much as they build.” Scruton asked, “Whom was the land taken from?...”[and] what makes the Aborigines now alive, the true inheritors of the ones that are dead?...The only thing that the present Aborigines have in common, if anything, with those from whom the original land was taken — if it were taken — is their race.” Restoring land to Aborigines “introduces an element of race hatred, at least in the more primitive white Australians.”

Quadrant columnist Anthony McAdam attacked John Pilger’s 1985 film about Aboriginal suffering, The Secret Country. McAdam wrote that “terrible things were done to Aboriginal people…just as I believe terrible things were done to many whites.” But he ridiculed “the now fashionable charge of ‘genocide’” and denounced “this exercise in national denigration” as an assault on “the nation’s honour.” He added: “Pilger’s apparent use of the Aboriginal issue...
to play on ‘white guilt’ for political purposes other than the one at hand appears to be an increasingly fashionable stratagem.”119

In a 1992 Quadrant article, Robert Murray denounced “inaccurate clichés that seem to be rapidly settling into the national consciousness,” including “Myth 1: Aborigines.” He posed “the big questions: Did we steal their land? And did our forebears commit ‘genocide’ against them?” To the first question, Murray replied: “Governors and governments nearly always meant well towards the blacks, but at the crunch favoured the development of the country—meaning whites moving into black land….Was the land stolen? It’s a matter of which way you look at it, but we should avoid being glib…. ” Turning to the second issue, Murray wrote that “settlers in Australia shot many thousands of Aborigines, mainly as grossly overreactive self-defence…. The shooting of 20,000 Aborigines—or even twice that number, as is possible—in a population of half a million to one million over 100 years, is tragic and shameful. It decimated communities. But it hardly amounts to ‘genocide’. . . .”120

In 1990, Quadrant appointed a new editor, Robert Manne, an admirer of Bob Santamaria though no apologist for Jakarta. Meanwhile, with the end of the cold war, Santamaria’s own views mellowed in his last years.121 Rejecting the economic rationalism of the New Right, he revisited some of his early anticorporate concerns. Manne, too, fell out with Quadrant’s board after he began in 1996 to print differing views on Aboriginal issues and on High Court judgments in favor of land rights.122 Then, in April 1997, the national Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission presented its finding that the removal of Aboriginal children had constituted genocide.123 This provoked a right-wing crisis. In June, Quadrant literary editor Les Murray accused Manne of taking “the received leftist line on Aborigines” over the previous year. Manne had lost the support of the Quadrant “old guard.” He resigned a few months later and has since written: “Over the next three years Quadrant became devoted to ever wilder and more extreme attacks on every cause and belief of the contemporary Aboriginal political leadership and its support base.”124

Olympian Denial

Before the 2000 Olympics, Prime Minister Howard was reported to be reading Quadrant “religiously,” and he even attended a conference sponsored by the magazine. In September 2000 the magazine held another conference, on Aboriginal matters.125 Onetime leftist Keith Windshuttle introduced a paper that Quadrant was to publish over its next three monthly issues: “The Myths of Frontier Massacres in Australian History.”126 Windshuttle looked simply at “the evidence of four events that recent historians have described as massacres,” and


argued that “only one of them deserves this description.” Two he considered “legitimate police operations” and a third, contrary to the finding of a Royal Commission, was “pure mythology. Not only was there no massacre but there was no good evidence that any Aborigines were ever killed.” “Most killings of Aborigines occurred not in large numbers but in ones and twos...there were some massacres, but they were rare and isolated,” “unusual events” with “their own specific causes.” 1127

Windshuttle asserted: “The notion that the frontier was a place where white men could kill blacks with impunity ignores the powerful cultural and legal prohibitions.”1128 But, as Henry Reynolds and Charles Rowley noted, Aborigines were barred from giving court testimony, on grounds that heathens could not be sworn. Only from 1876 were they allowed to testify in New South Wales courts, and from 1884 in Queensland.1129 Ignoring this, but citing Rowley as “the most reputable historian in the field,” 1130 Windshuttle also omitted Rowley’s many descriptions of the “massacres” and “exterminations” of Aborigines.1 Acusing a missionary of having in 1838 “invented the notion of...a war of extermination,” Windshuttle further ignored an 1836 official report to the British colonial secretary recalling a “war of extermination...here.”1131 Instead, he accused Aborigines’ supporters and historians who publicized their tragedy of having “fabricated” and “manufactured” stories to further their own careers.1132

1 Windshuttle wrote of another case that diaries of members of Stirling’s 1834 expedition say “they killed only a proportion” of 70-80 Aborigines (“The Myths of Frontier Massacres,” Quadrant 370 [XLIV, 10, October 2000]: 18). Citing Jan Critchett, A Distant Field of Murder: Western District Frontiers, 1834-1848 (Melbourne University Press, 1990), he also asserted that “only three events...involved mass killings” of Aborigines in Western Victoria in 1834-48, while he labeled the Aboriginal killing of six shepherds a “mass killing of Europeans” (Quadrant, November 2000, 21). But Critchett documented 111 events (not 3) meeting Windshuttle’s definition of a mass killing. The Aboriginal victims numbered, respectively, 10, “35-40,” 30-51, 8, 7, 9, 9, 8-20, “9 or 10,” 6, and 9 (Appendix 3). Windshuttle claimed Critchett “counts a total of 200 Aborigines killed by whites” (21); her figure was 300-350 (130-31). Ian Clark, Scars in the Landscape: A Register of Massacre Sites in Western Victoria, 1803-1859 (Canberra: AIATSIS, 1995) details 107 killing sites, including twenty-one where six or more Aborigines were killed.


2 Windshuttle has been answered effectively by Henry Reynolds, An Indelible Stain?: Ray Evans and Bill Thorpe, “Indigenocide and the Massacre of Australian History,” Overland, no. 163, July 2001, 21-59, and Age, 7 July 2001; Manne, In Denial."
Just as Heinz Arndt explained that “sections of the Australian Press...objected so violently to the incorporation of East Timor into Indonesia” because support for its independence came “from the left,” now Windshuttle pleaded that his opponents dominated the media too. To him, Robert Manne had become “a member of the Left establishment,” while my own work on Aboriginal genocides was supposedly “syndicated to English-language newspapers around the world.” The reverse was true. The new campaign to deny the Aboriginal genocide, led by Quadrant, was taken up in the Australian mass media by a chorus of right-wing columnists with records of antagonism to Aborigines and “leftist” supporters, and easy access to a wide public.  

Just as Santamaria targeted “Marxist” Jesuits, Windshuttle denounced the “tradition begun by missionaries in the early nineteenth century and perpetuated by academics in the late twentieth — of the invention of massacre stories.” He accused missionaries of lying — not the perpetrator troops, who in one case provided “the only eyewitness accounts.” He criticized the land rights movement as a modern secular version of the same Aboriginal “separatism” previously favored by the missionary with “a heady vision of himself as their physical protector.” Just as separatism “meant the missionaries would keep their funding and their jobs,” so “massacre stories, then and now, were often invented as ideological supports for the policy of separatism.”

At bottom, Windshuttle opposes Aboriginal land rights and covers up the history of massacres that strengthens the case for restitution. He recommends assimilation. “Instead of land rights, customary law and traditional culture, most of them want simply to live like the rest of us. The assimilation of the majority of the Aboriginal population is an accomplished fact.” Yet, some Aborigines wish to live on their traditional land and reclaim it. Denial of their land rights favors white claimants such as pastoral and mining corporations. Denial of the genocide, too, undercuts Aboriginal claims based on justice. It also helped a recalcitrant prime minister out of a tight corner at the Olympic Games.

**Conclusion**

Denial of genocide is often a function of simple political priorities — often ones not directly related to the genocide. In many cases the truth of the matter becomes clear and would not be denied, even if it could plausibly be. But in other cases, the stakes prove too high, or the victims too lowly. Revelation of such genocides might threaten a keystone policy (in these two cases: anticomunism, realpolitik, and refusal to redress injustice), require resource reallocation (land rights), embarrass a domestic political leader (John Howard) or international ally (Jakarta, Washington), or rehabilitate ideological dissidents (the “left”). In some such cases, genocide can be denied even when intellectually the facts are undeniable. Raw power, of course, often requires only a fig leaf of legitimacy. Policy plows ahead and, almost automatically, action produces its own apologists. Victims of genocide in small foreign territories like East Timor, or domestic groups with reduced surviving populations like Australian Aborigines, cannot easily contest geopolitical or domestic government priorities. Media attention to small countries, even those threatened with genocide, is usually
insufficient to threaten domestic policy-makers or make them pressure foreign perpetrators, for instance by cutting military supplies, which could have restrained Jakarta but embarrassed a powerful ally, the United States. Public opinion on foreign policy rarely determines national elections. Likewise, remnant survivors of genocides wield minimal electoral clout. In the Aboriginal case, on such a domestic issue their conservative opponents rebuffed the example of the same powerful ally: U.S. recognition of injustices to Native Americans. Even when media monopolies don’t consign the facts to obscurity, governments can often ignore both foreign models and domestic protests by victimized minorities — as well as protests against policies on faraway tragedies.

Genocide is the most serious crime against humanity. No politician wants to be accused of facilitating it. No American politician took any blame for the East Timor genocide, even though the United States armed Indonesia for years while the New York Times gave East Timor so little attention that as late as 1998 it mislabeled the territory a “former Dutch colony.”138 U.S. policy-makers could afford to be laconic. But under greater media scrutiny, as in Australia, policies favoring genocidal regimes require fantastic denials and defenses.

In the case of East Timor, for twenty-four years, a few conservatives attempted to cover up the unfolding truth both to defend established Australian and U.S. policy, and to deny “leftists” political points or moral credit. The plight of the Timorese came a poor third to these priorities. But in the end, official policy unraveled as the brutal nature of the Indonesian regime made stability impossible. Timorese resistance again outlasted a foreign occupier. Far from realpolitik, Indonesia’s adventure contributed to loss of its international standing and the eventual fall of the Suharto regime itself, with new threats to Indonesian unity and possibly to Australia’s security. And in a unique series of events, Australian public opinion, informed with the help of a citizen solidarity organization by knowledge of the carnage, swept away a bankrupt policy.
In 1999, Australian troops in UN berets dug in on the Indonesian border of East Timor. Just as John Howard, who sent them there, had once served in the Cabinet that policed the communications blackout on Timor, he now termed the memory of the Aboriginal genocide a “black armband” view of Australian history,139 recalling Japanese nationalists resentful of “masochistic” views of Japan’s war crimes.140 Conservatives denied the Aboriginal genocide not on the basis of historical facts, but largely because Aborigines had liberal or leftist supporters, corporate opponents were threatened by land rights, and their prime minister was being challenged. Timorese and Aborigines were pawns in much larger games. The stakes of recognizing past injustices remain grounded in the present, in domestic debate, and perennial issues of power.

Notes

3. Manning joined the CPA in 1959 in his Queensland home town, on the advice of “an ex-Party member who had been expelled during the early fifties in some Stalinist purges.” This dissident communist “encouraged me to join and advised that I continue to retain a capacity to think for myself” (personal communication, 9 June 2001). Manning was founding Secretary of Darwin’s Trades and Labor Council (1971-74) and Secretary of the Darwin branch of the Waterside Workers’ Federation (1968-74, 1978-82, 1996-2000).
5. Manning, “Charlie India Echo Tango.”
7. Manning, “Charlie India Echo Tango”; Ball and McDonald, Death in Balibo, 178-80; Freney, A Map of Days, 357-64, 369-73; Tiffen, Diplomatic Decuets, 27.


13. See Bernard Callinan, Independent Company (London: Heinemann, 1953); Tom Uren, Straight Left (Sydney: Vintage, 1995): 17-26, 300-03, 475-82; Cliff Morris, “Australian WW II Commando Remembers,” Retrieval (Melbourne) 36 (April/May 1977): 12-18. Australian units involved in East Timor were the 2/2nd Independent Company (Callinan) and the 2/4th (Morris); in West Timor, the 2/21 and the 2/40 Infantry Battallion, and the 2/1 Heavy Battery (Uren).


16. Dunn, Timor: A People Betrayed, 100.


25. In a speech to a peace rally on 28 May 1939, Santamaria described aerial bombardment as “the new creation...as hideous as any invented by the perverted genius of fallen man” (quoted in Ormonde, 98).


28. For documentation of Movement attempts to control labor organizations, see Duncan, Crusade or Conspiracy? 64, 99, 128, 155-57, 159, 177, 183-84, 189,


31. Duncan, *Crusade or Conspiracy?* 159, 163.

32. Ibid., 185, quoting *News Weekly*, 31 December 1952, 1.


39. James McAuley, “Australia’s Future in New Guinea,” *Pacific Affairs* 26, 1 (March 1953): 63-64. Urging an end to “social discrimination on grounds of race,” McAuley also predicted a “one-way assimilation of native life to Western culture” in which “indigenous traditional cultures... seem bound to be more or less completely effaced” (67, 69). See also Pybus, *The Devil and James McAuley*, 115, 119-22, 183-84.

40. According to former CIA agent John Stockwell, the Agency estimated the death toll in the massacres of Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) members at 800,000 (*Harpers*, September 1984, 42). A CIA report added that “in terms of the numbers killed the anti-PKI massacres in Indonesia rank as one of the worst mass murders of the twentieth century, along with the Soviet purges of the 1930s, the Nazi mass murders during the Second World War and the Maoist blood-baths of the 1950s” (Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, *Intelligence Report: Indonesia-1965, The Coup that Backfired*, Langley, 1968).


44. Taylor, *East Timor: The Price of Freedom*, 64, says the State Department dubbed the visit “the big wink”; C. Pinto, A. Nairn, ’Ask Kissinger about East Timor” (www.etan.org/news/kissinger/ask.htm).


49. Walsh, “Australia’s Support,” 14-16, naming also Heinz Arndt and Gough Whitlam.


60. Brian Brunton, “Australia’s Indonesia Lobby Observed,” *Inside Indonesia*, no. 11 (August 1987): 23-24. “The real danger of the struggle within Indonesia, as it was in Vietnam, to conservative Australia, is not the domino effect….The real danger lies in the possible spillover into Australian politics of nationalist sentiment that would move Australia out of the ANZUS alliance.”


62. Chomsky and Herman, 200, 151.


70. Anthony McAdam, “Innocence abroad is a grave menace,” *Melbourne Herald*, 18 November 1983. To McAdam, the Philippines under Marcos was also “relatively pluralistic.”

71. Quoted in Tiffen, *Diplomatic Decrets*, 77.


75. H.W. Arndt, “Portugal’s litigation just an excuse for propaganda,” Canberra Times, February 10, 1995 (www.dfa-deplu.go.id/english/ arndt.htm). Arndt had posed this question in Quadrant twenty years earlier (May 1976, 17). Now, “the chief explanation is that support for an independent East Timor came from the beginning from the left of the political spectrum.”


77. Tiffen, Diplomatic Deceits, 77; Burchill, “The Jakarta Lobby.”


80. Evans, “Revealed: the plot to crush Timor,” South China Morning Post, September 16, 1999, again quoting Tomas Goncalves, a witness to Governor Soares’ statement.


86. See Budiardjo and Lioni, The War against East Timor, 8-11; Taylor, East Timor, 84, 133-34, 174-75, 203; Ball and McDonald, Death in Balibo, 182; Tanter, Bitter Flowers, 135-56, 163-72.


90. Dunn, Timor: A People Betrayed, 199, 203, 262, 383.

91. The 750,000 figure is that of anthropologist Dr. Peter White and pre-historian Prof. D.J. Mulvaney, quoted in Sydney Morning Herald, February 25, 1987. See also Noel Butlin, Our Original Aggression: Aboriginal Populations of Southbeust-


95. Ibid., 35, 60.


100. The CPA’s 1931 policy stated: “no struggle of the white workers must be permitted without demands for the aborigines being championed.” Macintyre, The Reds, 265-67 (also 126, 150, 353). The policy was the first on Aboriginal rights to be adopted by a major Australian political party. The first novel with an Aboriginal woman as the major character was Coonardoo (1928), by Australian communist Katherine Susannah Pritchard. See F. S. Stevens, ed., Racism, The Australian Experience, vol. 2, Black versus White (Sydney: ANZ Books, 1972), ch. 3.

101. Duncan, Crusade or Conspiracy?, 48, 89; Don Watson, Brian Fitzpatrick (Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 1979), 202-3.


104. Manning, personal communication, 4 June and 12 July 2001; Aborigines joined “from all over the place.”


106. “Gurindji Tribe,” The Australian Encyclopedia, 1482-83. In 2000, at the Wattie Creek commemoration, Manning said he was “proud to have been a part of the organization of the 1966 walk off.” See also Ann McGrath and Kay Saunders, Aboriginal Workers, special issue of Labour History 69 (November 1995): 45.

107. For details, see Frank Hardy, The Unlucky Australians (Sydney: Pan, 1978, first edition 1968), 114-17, 282-87; Dennis Schulz, “Gurindji fight to do things their
way,” Age, 21 August 2000. Other Aboriginal groups and “white northern sympathisers” like Manning played a “decisive” role in support of the Gurindji (The Australian Encyclopedia, 285).


109. In 1975, the Australian government purchased from Vestey 3,250 square kilometers, which was awarded to the Muramulla Gurindji Company. “Gurindji Tribe,” The Australian Encyclopedia, 1482-83.


120. R. Murray, “Seven Myths about Australia,” Quadrant 286, XXXVI: 5 (May 1992): 40-41. Four years later Murray surveyed the killings and wrote that their impact “was close to genocidal in limited areas, but it was not genocide.” Quadrant 331, XL: 11 (November 1996): 19.


122. See, for example, Richard H. Bartlett, The Mabo Decision (Sydney: Butterworths, 1993).

123. Wilson, Bringing Them Home, 275.


133. Windshuttle, “The Fabrication of Aboriginal History.” I had in fact sent my article to the Australian newspaper, which replied: “Space is at a premium given the Olympics” (Features Editor, 7 September 2000). The Melbourne Age undertook to print my article, but did not. I successfully placed it in the Bangkok Post (10 September 2000).
135. Windshuttle, Quadrant, October 2000, 9, 16-17.
137. Ibid., 20.
139. See Tatz, “It Didn’t Happen.”
140. Kiroku Hanai, “Close the Book on Censorship,” Japan Times, 2 April 2001; Gavan McCormack, “The Japanese Movement to ‘Correct’ History,” in Censoring History: Citizenship and Memory in Japan, Germany, and the United States, ed. Laura Hein and Mark Selden (London/Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 2000), 53-73. In light of Timor’s World War II suffering, the view of a leading Japanese newspaper seems more enlightened: Asabi Shimbun warned against attempts “to sweep Japan’s negative wartime behaviour under the rug, such as its victimization of people in other countries, in the guise of “overcoming a masochistic view of history.” If children are confined to such a normative view, their “understanding of — and affection for — the land and history of the country,” the supposed object of study, will only have a very frail foundation.” “Even with Changes, Textbooks Not Fit for Tomorrow’s Leaders,” Asabi Shimbun, 4 April 2001, published 5 April 2001.